The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1989/89_1895/89_1895.o

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Subject: ASTORIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. SOLIMINO, 89-1895 -- OPINION

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-1895


ASTORIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER v. ANGELO J.
SOLIMINO

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second
circuit

[June 10, 1991]



    Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.

    The question presented is whether claimants under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Age Act or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. MDRV 621 et seq., are collaterally estopped to
relitigate in federal court the judicially unreviewed findings of a state
administrative agency made with respect to an age-discrimination claim.  We
hold that such findings have no preclusive effect on federal proceedings.
    Respondent Angelo Solimino had worked for petitioner Astoria Federal
Savings and Loan Association for almost 40 years when at age 63 he was
dismissed from his position as a vice president in the mortgage department.
Less than two weeks later, on March 18, 1982, he filed a charge of age
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Under a worksharing agreement between it and the state agency, see 29 CFR
MDRV 1626.10 (1990), the EEOC referred the matter to the New York State
Division of Human Rights, which is responsible for preliminary
investigation and disposition of age-discrimination cases under New York's
Human Rights Law.  On January 25, 1983, after a hearing at which both
parties were represented by counsel, the state agency found no probable
cause to believe that petitioner had terminated respondent because of his
age.  The ruling was affirmed on review for abuse of discretion by the
State Human Rights Appeal Board on May 30, 1984.  Although both the
Division and the Appeal Board entertained respondent's complaint only on
state-law grounds, neither party suggests that the elements of an
age-discrimination claim differ as between the state and federal statutes.
    Respondent did not seek review of the board's decision in state court,
but instead filed an Age Act suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York grounded on the same factual allegations
considered in the state administrative proceedings.  The District Court
granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, 715 F. Supp. 42 (1989),
and relied heavily on the decision in Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F. 2d 276 (CA8
1988), in holding the commonlaw presumption of administrative estoppel to
prevail by virtue of Congress' failure in either the language or
legislative history of the Age Act "actually [to] addres[s] the issue."
715 F. Supp., at 47.  It ruled accordingly that the determination of the
State's Human Rights Division that petitioner had not engaged in age
discrimination precluded federal litigation of the claim.  The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 901 F. 2d 1148 (1990), inferring
from the Act's structure a legislative intent to deny preclusive effect to
such state administrative proceedings.  We granted certiorari, 498 U. S.
--- (1991), to resolve the conflict between the ruling here under review,
see also Duggan v. Board of Education of East Chicago Heights, Dist. No.
169, Cook County, Ill., 818 F. 2d 1291 (CA7 1987), and those of the Eighth
Circuit in Stillians, supra, and of the Ninth Circuit in Mack v. South Bay
Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F. 2d 1279 (1986).
    We have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of
collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those
determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality.  "When
an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves
disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply
res judicata to enforce repose."  United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U. S. 394, 422 (1966).  Such repose is justified on the sound and
obvious principle of judicial policy that a losing litigant deserves no
rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an
issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise.  To
hold otherwise would, as a general matter, impose unjustifiably upon those
who have already shouldered their burdens, and drain the resources of an
adjudicatory system with disputes resisting resolution.  See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326 (1979).  The principle holds true
when a court has resolved an issue, and should do so equally when the issue
has been decided by an administrative agency, be it state or federal, see
University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U. S. 788, 798 (1986), which acts
in a judicial capacity.
    Courts do not, of course, have free rein to impose rules of preclusion,
as a matter of policy, when the interpretation of a statute is at hand.  In
this context, the question is not whether administrative estoppel is wise
but whether it is intended by the legislature.  The presumption holds
nonetheless, for Congress is understood to legislate against a background
of common-law adjudicatory principles.  See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325
(1983); United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957).  Thus, where a
common-law principle is well established, as are the rules of preclusion,
see, e. g., Parklane Hosiery, supra; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971); Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940), the courts may
take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
principle will apply except "when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident."  Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952).
    This interpretative presumption is not, however, one that entails a
requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress must state
precisely any intention to overcome the presumption's application to a
given statutory scheme.  Rules of plain statement and strict construction
prevail only to the protection of weighty and constant values, be they
constitutional, see, e. g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U. S.
234, 243 (1985) (requiring plain statement of intention to abrogate
immunity of States under the Eleventh Amendment), or otherwise, see, e. g.,
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. ---, --- (slip op. 3) (1991)
(requiring plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect, "to
protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord").  See generally
Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1007 (1989).  "In traditionally sensitive areas, . . . the requirement of
clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and
intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial
decision."  United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971).  Similar
superior values, of harmonizing different statutes and constraining
judicial discretion in the interpretation of the laws, prompt the kindred
rule that legislative repeals by implication will not be recognized,
insofar as two statutes are capable of co-existence, "absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary."  Morton v. Mancari, 417
U. S. 535, 551 (1974).
    But the possibility of such an implied repeal does not cast its shadow
here.  We do not have before us the judgment of a state court, which would
by law otherwise be accorded "the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States . . . as [it has] by law or usage in the courts of
such State."  28 U. S. C. MDRV 1738.  In the face of MDRV 1738, we have
found state court judgments in the closely parallel context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. MDRV
2000e et seq., see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 584 (1978), to enjoy
preclusive effect in the federal courts.  See Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U. S. 461 (1982); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90
(1980).  This case, by contrast, implicates no such implied repeal, as MDRV
1738 is inapplicable to the judicially unreviewed findings of state
administrative bodies.  See Elliott, supra, at 794.  Nor does
administrative preclusion represent independent values of such magnitude
and constancy as to justify the protection of a clear-statement rule.
Although administrative estoppel is favored as a matter of general policy,
its suitability may vary according to the specific context of the rights at
stake, the power of the agency, and the relative adequacy of agency
procedures.  Cf. Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 57-58
(1974); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281, 285 (1906).  The presumption
here is thus properly accorded sway only upon legislative default, applying
where Congress has failed expressly or impliedly to evince any intention on
the issue.
    In Elliott, which also dealt with Title VII, the test for the
presumption's application was thus framed as the question "whether a
common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent in
enacting [the statute]."  478 U. S., at 796.  See also Brown v. Felsen, 442
U. S. 127, 136 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments MDRV 83(4)(a)
(1982).  In contrast to 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1983, in which the Court discerned
" `[n]othing . . . remotely express[ing] any congressional intent to
contravene the common-law rules of preclusion,' " 478 U. S., at 797
(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 97-98 (1980)), Title VII was found
by implication to comprehend just such a purpose in its direction that the
EEOC accord " `substantial weight to final findings and orders made by
State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local
[employment discrimination] law.' "  Elliott, supra, at 795 (quoting 42 U.
S. C. MDRV 2000e-5(b)).  What does not preclude a federal agency cannot
preclude a federal court, see Kremer, supra, at 470, and n. 7; Duggan, 818
F. 2d, at 1294; we accordingly held that in the district courts the
"substantial weight" standard allowed clearly for something less than
preclusion.  Elliott, supra, at 795.
    We reach the same result here, for the Age Act, too, carries an
implication that the federal courts should recognize no preclusion by state
administrative findings with respect to age-discrimination claims.  While
the statute contains no express delimitation of the respect owed to state
agency findings, its filing requirements make clear that collateral
estoppel is not to apply.  Section 14(b) requires that where a State has
its own age-discrimination law, a federal Age Act complainant must first
pursue his claim with the responsible state authorities before filing in
federal court.  29 U. S. C. MDRV 633(b); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750 (1979).  It further provides that "no suit may be brought under [the
Age Act] before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated."  The deadline for filing with the EEOC likewise refers to the
termination of prior state administrative action, MDRV 7(d)(2) providing
that where MDRV 14(b) applies "[s]uch a charge shall be filed . . . within
300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days
after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings
under State law, whichever is earlier."  29 U. S. C. MDRV 626(d)(2).  Both
provisions plainly assume the possibility of federal consideration after
state agencies have finished theirs.
    And yet such federal proceedings would be strictly pro forma if state
administrative findings were given preclusive effect.  It goes without
saying that complainants who succeed in state proceedings will not pursue
suit in federal court (except perhaps when the state remedy, or its
enforcement, is thought to be inadequate); MDRV 14(b)'s requirement that
claimants file with state authorities before doing so in federal court was
in fact "intended to screen from the federal courts those discrimination
complaints that might be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in
state proceedings."  Oscar Mayer, supra, at 756.  A complainant who looks
to a federal court after termination of state proceedings will therefore
ordinarily do so only when the state agency has held against him.  In such
a case, however, the employer would likely enjoy an airtight defense of
collateral estoppel if a state agency determination on the merits were
given preclusive effect.  Cf. Kremer, 456 U. S., at 479-480.  Insofar as
applying preclusion would thus reduce to insignificance those cases in
which federal consideration might be pursued in the wake of the completed
proceedings of state agencies, MDRV 14(b)'s provision for just such
consideration would be left essentially without effect.  But of course we
construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any
parts thereof.  See, e. g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528,
538-539 (1955).
    That the Age Act lacks the "substantial weight" provision of Title
VII's MDRV 2000e-5(b) stressed in Elliott is immaterial.  There was nothing
talismanic about that language; it was "simply the most obvious piece of
evidence that administrative res judicata does not operate in a Title VII
suit."  Duggan, supra, at 1297.  It would indeed be ironic if that section
were to make the difference between that statute and the Age Act insofar as
preclusion in federal courts is concerned, for the language was added to
Title VII not because the EEOC was applying administrative preclusion, or
"giving state administrative decisions too much weight, but because it was
affording them too little."  Kremer, supra, at 471, n. 8.  Similar
provision has been unnecessary in the Age Act, for as to age-discrimination
claims the EEOC of its own accord came to extend some level of deference to
the determinations of state authorities.  See Brief for United States et
al. as Amici Curiae 24.  It is, in any event, fair to say that even without
Title VII's "substantial weight" requirement the Court would have found no
administrative preclusion in that context.  Title VII's MDRV 706(c), 42 U.
S. C. MDRV 2000e-5(c), which also provides for federal court action in the
aftermath of terminated state proceedings and is nearly identical to the
Age Act's MDRV 14(b), see Oscar Mayer, supra, at 755, would have provided
yet further support for the Court's result there.
    Thus MDRV 14(b) suffices to outweigh the lenient presumption in favor
of administrative estoppel, a holding that also comports with the broader
scheme of the Age Act and the provisions for its enforcement.
Administrative findings with respect to the age-discrimination claims of
federal employees enjoy no preclusive effect in subsequent judicial
litigation, see Rosenfeld v. Department of Army, 769 F. 2d 237 (CA4 1985);
Nabors v. United States, 568 F. 2d 657 (CA9 1978); cf. Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840 (1976) (same, with respect to Title VII claims),
and since there is no reason to believe federal enforcement agencies any
less competent than their state counterparts, it would be anomalous to
afford more deference to one than the other.  It would, indeed, invite
further capricious anomalies as well, for whether age discrimination claims
are investigated first by the EEOC or by state authorities is a matter over
which the complainant has no control, see 29 CFR 15 1626.9, 1626.10 (1990);
whether or not he might receive his day in court (complete with jury, see
29 U. S. C. MDRV 626(c)(2)), would then depend, under petitioner's theory,
on bureaucratic chance.  Petitioner's reading would also lead to
disparities from State to State, depending on whether a given jurisdiction
had an age-discrimination statute of its own.  See MDRV 633 (b).  Moreover,
on the assumption that claimants fare better in federal court than before
state agencies, and in light of MDRV 14(a)'s provision that state
proceedings are superseded upon commencement of federal action, see MDRV
633(a), a recognition of administrative estoppel here would induce all
claimants to initiate federal suit at the earliest opportunity after filing
the state complaint, thereby defeating the purpose of deferral to resolve
complaints outside the federal system.  See Oscar Mayer, supra, at
755-756.
    Finally, although the wisdom of Congress' decision against according
preclusive effect to state agency rulings has no bearing upon the
disposition of the case, that choice has plausible policy support.
Although it is true that there will be some duplication of effort, the
duplication need not be great.  We speak, after all, only of agency
determinations not otherwise subjected to judicial review; our reading of
the statute will provide no more than a second chance to prove the claim,
and even then state administrative findings may be entered into evidence at
trial.  See Chandler, supra, at 863, n. 39 (1976).  It also may well be
that Congress thought state agency consideration generally inadequate to
insure full protection against age discrimination in employment.  In this
very case, the New York Division of Human Rights, which ruled against
respondent on the merits, has itself appeared as amicus on his behalf,
highlighting the shortfalls of its procedures and resources.  See Brief for
Attorney General of State of New York as Amicus Curiae 18-22.
Alternatively, by denying preclusive effect to any such agency
determination, Congress has eliminated litigation that would otherwise
result, from State to State and case to case, over whether the agency has
in fact "act[ed] in a judicial capacity," and afforded the parties "an
adequate opportunity to litigate," Utah Constr. Co., 384 U. S., at 422, so
as to justify application of a normal rule in favor of estoppel.
    For these reasons, the District Court's grant of petitioner's motion
for summary judgment was erroneous on the grounds stated.  The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the District
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    It is so ordered.



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